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Abstract
The equilibrium prices in asset markets, as stated by Keynes (1930): “...will
be …xed at the point at which the sales of the bears and the purchases of the bulls
are balanced.” We propose a descriptive theory of …nance explicating Keynes’
claim that the prices of assets today equilibrate the optimism and pessimism of
bulls and bears regarding the payo¤s of assets tomorrow.
This equilibration of optimistic and pessimistic beliefs of investors is a consequence of investors maximizing Keynesian utilities subject to budget constraints
de…ned by market prices and investor’s income. The set of Keynesian utilities
is a new class of non-expected utility functions representing the preferences of
investors for optimism or pessimism, de…ned as the composition of the investor’s
preferences for risk and her preferences for ambiguity. Bulls and bears are de…ned
respectively as optimistic and pessimistic investors. (Ir)rational exuberance is
an intrinsic property of asset markets where bulls and bears are endowed with
Keynesian utilities.
JEL Classi…cation: D81, G02, G11
Keywords: Keynes, Bulls and bears, Expectations, Asset markets
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Introduction

“Irrational exuberance,”following Alan Greenspan, describes “unduly escalated asset
values.”Robert Shiller (2000; second edition 2005), in his now classic book, explains
irrational exuberance in the stock- and the real estate-markets by invoking 12 factors
taken from sociology, psychology and economics. Despite the contrast between the
rich account Shiller proposes for irrational exuberance and the minimalism of our
models of …nancial markets and investor’s psychology, we propose a rational model of
(ir)rational exuberance in asset markets. That is, the behavior of bulls and bears is
rational in the standard economic sense of agents maximizing (non-expected) utility
subject to a budget constraint, de…ned by market prices and the agent’s income. This
Research Department, The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 600 Atlantic Avenue, Boston, MA
02210, USA
y
Department of Economics, Yale University, Box 208268, New Haven, CT 06520-8268, USA
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new class of non-expected utilities, labeled Keynesian utilities, incorporates investor’s
preferences for optimism. Keynesian utility is an empirically tractable and descriptive
characterization of an investor’s preferences in …nancial markets, where she is either
a bull or a bear. Simply put, bulls are optimists who believe that market prices will
go up, while bears are pessimists who believe that market prices will go down. The
equilibrium prices in asset markets, as stated by Keynes (1930): “. . . will be …xed at
the point at which the sales of the bears and the purchases of the bulls are balanced.”
The market prices today therefore equilibrate the odds expected by bulls and bears
of the payo¤s tomorrow. Keynesian utilities are de…ned as the composition of the
investor’s preferences for risk and her preferences for ambiguity, where preferences for
risk and preferences for ambiguity are assumed to be independent. If U (x) denotes
preferences for risk, and J(y) denotes preferences for ambiguity then
U :X

N
R++
!Y

N
R++

and
J :Y

N
R++
!R

where
x!J

U (x)

is the composition of U and J, denoted J U (x):
In our model, bulls are investors endowed with convex Keynesian utilities and
bears are investors endowed with concave Keynesian utilities. It follows from convex
analysis that these speci…cations are equivalent to investors being bulls if and only if
they have optimistic beliefs about the future payo¤s of state-contingent claims and
investors are bears if and only if they have pessimistic beliefs about the future payo¤s
of state-contingent claims.
Table 1 below summarizes the types of Keynesian utilities, where the cells are
investors’ preferences for optimism and pessimism. An investor who is both risk
averse and ambiguity averse is a bear, i.e., a pessimist. Similarly, an investor who is
both risk seeking and ambiguity seeking is a bull, i.e., an optimist. These cases, the
diagonal cells of the table, are the symmetric Keynesian utilities and the o¤-diagonal
cells of the table are the asymmetric Keynesian utilities.
Table 1: Keynesian Preferences
Keynesian preferences Risk-averse Risk-seeking
Ambiguity-averse
Bears
Asymmetric
Ambiguity-seeking
Asymmetric
Bulls
Economists probably believe bears have Keynesian utilities that are the composition of ambiguity-averse preferences and risk-averse preferences or that bulls have
Keynesian utilities that are the composition of ambiguity-seeking preferences and
risk-seeking preferences, where we assume that both U and J are monotone. This
observation follows from the theorems in convex analysis on the convexity or concavity
of the composition of monotone convex or concave functions, see section 3.2 in Boyd
and Vandenberghe (2004). It may be surprising to economists that for asymmetric
2

Keynesian utilities, given , the proxy for risk, and , the proxy for ambiguity, that
there exists a state-contingent claim x
^, “the reference point,” where for quadratic
utilities of ambiguity and risk, J U (x) is concave or pessimistic on
[^
x; +1]
and J

N
fx 2 R+
:x

x
^g

U (x) is convex or optimistic on
(0; x
^]

N
fx 2 R+
:x

x
^g:

That is, an investor with quadratic utilities of ambiguity and quadratic utilities
of risk is a bull for “losses,” and a bear for “gains,” reminiscent of the shape of risk
preferences in prospect theory (see Kahneman 2011).
In the next section we brie‡y review the theory of a¤ective decision making (ADM)
which incorporates optimism bias as proposed by Bracha and Brown (2012). In Sections 3 and 4 we consider separable and quadratic speci…cations of utilities for risk
and ambiguity to illustrate Keynesian utilities where optimists are not always risk
and ambiguity seeking and pessimists are not always risk and ambiguity averse. In
the …nal section of the paper, we explicate Keynes’claim that the prices of assets today equilibrate the optimism and pessimism of bulls and bears regarding the payo¤s
of assets tomorrow. We consider market equilibrium in asset markets where investors
are endowed with Keynesian utilities. We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium, in a exchange economy with two states of the world, where market prices
re‡ect the payo¤s of future asset realizations as perceived by bears who diversify and
bulls who speculate, i.e., invest only in assets with optimistic payo¤s. Nevertheless,
with a continuum of bulls their aggregate demand is typically diversi…ed. In a parametric, exchange economy with two states of the world and two types of bulls we
derive the comparative statics of the unique competitive equilibrium.
Finally, a few words about the notions of risk, uncertainty, ambiguity, and optimism as they are used in this paper. For Bernoulli (1738) risk means we know
the probabilities of tomorrow’s state of the world. For Keynes (1937) uncertainty
means we do not know the probabilities, in fact the notion of probability of states of
the world tomorrow may be meaningless. Ellsberg (1961) introduced the notion of
ambiguity as the alternative notion to risk, where we are ignorant of the probability
of states of the world tomorrow. For Ellsberg there are two kinds of uncertainty: risk
and ambiguity. These are the conventions we follow.
Optimism (pessimism) as proposed in Bracha and Brown refers to the investor’s
perceived probability, which is skewed towards the more favorable (unfavorable) outcome and is de…ned with respect to state-utility vectors. The formulation of Bracha
and Brown is an elaboration of the notion of optimism bias introduced by Bracha
(2005) in her analysis of insurance markets. The contribution of ADM is the presentation of a new class of preferences that provides a formal de…nition of optimism bias,
where the representation of ADM utilities as biconjugates of convex functions is similar to the formal de…nition of ambiguity aversity in the representation of variational
preferences, introduced by Maccheroni, Marinacci, Rustichini (2006), as biconjugates

3

of concave functions. This similarity suggests that in Bracha and Brown optimism
bias and ambiguity seeking have the same formal expression.
In this paper, we de…ne optimism (pessimism) with respect to future outcomes of
state-contingent claims, not state-utility vectors, where optimism (pessimism) refers
to the investor’s perceived beliefs today regarding the relative likelihood of large
versus small payo¤s of a state-contingent claim tomorrow. Optimism (pessimism) is
now a function of both the investor’s attitudes towards risk and her attitudes towards
ambiguity.

2

Optimism Bias and Preferences for Ambiguity

Ambiguity-neutral or subjective expected utility functions, originally proposed by
Savage (1954), as the foundation of Bayesian statistics, are a class of preferences
where the probability of an event is independent of the prize o¤ered contingent on
that event. It therefore “... does not leave room for optimism or pessimism to play
any role in the person’s judgment” (Savage 1954; p. 68). This claim is inconsistent
with the view of Keynes who, as we previously noted, thought of the market price
as a balance of the sales of bears, the pessimists, and the purchases of bulls, the
optimists. And it is also not the view of Ellsberg (1961), whose explanation of his
famous Ellsberg paradox is that subjective probabilities depends on payo¤s and is
therefore consistent with the notions of optimism or pessimism bias. In‡uenced by
Keynes and Ellsberg, Bracha and Brown (2012) proposed formal de…nitions of each
bias, where
X
J(U (x))
max [
U (x) + J ( )]
N
2R++

is the Legendre–Fenchel biconjugate of the optimistic utility function J(U (x)) and
X
J(U (x))
min [
U (x) + J ( )]
N
2R++

is the Legendre-Fenchel biconjugate of the pessimistic utility function J(U (x)). If
F (y) is a vector-valued map from RN into RN , then F is strictly, monotone increasing
if for all x and y 2 RN :
[x y] [F (x) F (y)] > 0:
If F (y) is a vector-valued map from RN into RN ;then F is strictly, monotone decreasing if for all x and y 2 RN :
[x

y] [F (x)

F (y)] < 0:

Bracha and Brown observed that J(z) is strictly convex in z where z = U (x) i¤
rz J(z) is a strictly, monotone increasing map of z and J(z) is strictly concave in z
where z = U (x) i¤ rz J(z) is a strictly, monotone decreasing map of z. See section
5.4.3 in Ortega and Rheinboldt (1970) for proof. If rz J(z) is a strictly monotone
increasing map of z, then the investor beliefs are skewed towards the higher utility
outcomes of a given action, i.e., she is optimistic and if rz J(z) is a strictly, monotone
4

decreasing map of z, then the investor beliefs are skewed towards the lower utility
outcomes of a given action, i.e., she is pessimistic. It follows from the envelope
theorem,
X
rz J(z) = arg max [
U (x) + J ( )] = ^ , where
N
2R++

X
J(U (x)) = max [

U (x) + J ( )] =

N
2R++

and

rz J(z) = arg min [
N
2R++

J(U (x)) = min [
N
2R++

X

X

X

b U (x) + J (^ )]

U (x) + J ( )] = ^ , where

U (x) + J ( )] =

X

^ U (x) + J (^ )]

If z = U (x), then it follows from ADM that the mathematical equivalence between
the convexity of J(z) with respect to z and the increasing monotonicity of the
gradient map rz J(z) implies the behavioral equivalence between ambiguity seeking
and optimism bias. It also follows from variational preferences that the mathematical equivalence between the concavity of J(z) with respect to z and the decreasing
monotonicity of the gradient map rz J(z) implies the behavioral equivalence between
ambiguity aversity and pessimism bias
In our 2012 paper, optimism (pessimism) is de…ned with respect to state-utility
vectors, U (x), which are unobservable. For empirical applications of optimism bias
and pessimism bias in asset markets, we require de…nitions of optimism or pessimism
for investors choosing state-contingent claims x. As we demonstrated in our previous
paper, the notions of optimism or pessimism depend on the structure of the investor’s
utility function. If the Keynesian composite utility function is convex (concave) in
x then the investor is optimistic (pessimistic). It follows from the envelope theorem applied to the Legendre–Fenchel biconjugate representation of convex (concave)
functions, that the gradient of the investor’s utility function with respect to x is a
strictly monotone increasing (decreasing) map. The value of the gradient at x is the
investor’s perceived probability distribution for x. This de…nition of optimism or pessimism with respect to state-contingent claims is no longer a function of ambiguity
attitudes alone; rather, it depends on both the investor’s risk and ambiguity attitudes. This is an immediate consequence of the chain rule in computing the gradient
of the composite Keynesian utility function. In the next two sections we illustrate
this joint dependence for additively separable and quadratic Keynesian utilities. In
this section, we de…ne optimistic and pessimistic Keynesian utilities J U (x) over
state-contingent claims x:For bulls,
X
J U (x)
max [
x + J ( )]
N
2R++

the Legendre–Fenchel conjugate of J U (x), where J ( ) is a smooth convex function
N and
on R++
X
J ( )
max [
x + J U (x)]:
N
x2R++
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For bears,
J

X
min [

U (x)

N
2R++

x + J ( )]

the Legendre–Fenchel conjugate of J U (x), where J ( ) is a smooth concave function
N , and
on R++
X
J ( )
min [
x + J U (x)]:
N
x2R++

As in Bracha and Brown, it follows from the envelope theorem,
X
rx J U (x) = arg max [
x + J ( )] = ^ , where
N
2R++

J

U (x) = max [
N
2R++

and
rx J
J

X

x + J ( )] =

X
U (x) = arg min [
N
2R++

X
U (x) = min [
N
2R++

X

^ x + J (^ )]

x + J ( )] = ^ , where

x + J ( )] =

X

b x + J (^ )]:

The odds expected today by bulls or bears of the market prices tomorrow, for the
state-contingent claim x
^ is derived from the odds de…ned by rx J U (^
x). That is,
^
rx J U (x)
=
2
krx J U (x)k1
k^ k1

0

;

(x)
de…ne the
the interior of the probability simplex . Hence rx J U (x) and krrxxJJ UU(x)k
1
same perceived betting odds that a given payo¤ of x will be realized. If J(U (x))
is ambiguity-seeking and U (y)and U (z) di¤er in only state t of the world, where
u(vt ) > u(zt ), the optimistic investor “perceives” that

1

Pr(u(vt )
Pr(u(zt ))
>
Pr(u(vt ))
1 Pr(u(zt ))

and J(U (v)) > J(U (z)) consistent with Ellsberg’s explanation of ambiguity-seeking
behavior. Hence ambiguity-seeking investors are bulls. If J(U (x)) is ambiguityaverse and U (y)and U (z) di¤er in only state t of the world, where u(vt ) > u(zt ).The
pessimistic investor “perceives” that
1

Pr(u(vt ))
Pr(u(zt ))
<
Pr(u(vt ))
1 Pr(u(zt ))

and J(U (v)) < J(U (z)) consistent with Ellsberg’s explanation of ambiguity-averse
behavior. Hence ambiguity-averse investors are bears.
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3

Separable Utilities for Risk and Ambiguity

In this section we examine the relationship between optimism/pessimism and risk
and ambiguity attitudes in the case of additively-separable Keynesian utility. We
start by taking a parametric example. Speci…cally, we consider utility functions on
the space of state-contingent claims and utility functions on the space of state-utility
vectors. That is,
s=N
X
J U (x)
j u(xs )
s=1

J(U (x))

s=N
X

j(u(xs ))

s=1

where
x

(x1 ; x2 ; ::; xN ); U (x)

(u(x1 ); u(x2 ); :::; u(xN )) and j

u(xs )

xs :

If
u(xs )

xs then j

u(xs )

xs and j(u(x))

[(xs )] :

With this example, it is easy to see that optimistic or pessimistic investors, that
is investors with convex or concave composite Keynesian utilities, can result from
di¤erent combinations of risk and ambiguity attitudes. For instance, if 6 2, then
u(xs ) is concave in xs : If
6 2, then 6 2= and j u(xs ) is concave in xs . Hence,
the composite utility function j u(xs ) is pessimistic. If
> 2, then j(u(xs )) is
convex in u(xs ). In this case, J U (x) is concave in x and J(U (x))is convex in U (x)
If 6 2, then u(xs ) is concave in xs : If
> 2, then > 2= and j u(xs ) is
convex in xs . Hence, the composite utility function j u(xs ) is optimistic. If > 2,
then j(u(xs )) is convex in u(xs ). In this case, J U (x) is convex in x and J(U (x))
is convex in U (x). These examples show that since the value of
determines if the
investor is endowed with a pessimistic or optimistic Keynesian utility functions, it is
possible that investors can be pessimistic or optimistic over state-contingent claims
and be risk averse and ambiguity seeking over state-utility vectors.
We now present a nonparametric example of Keynesian utilities, where we again
consider additively-separable utility functions of the form
J

U (x)

s=N
X

j

u(xs )

s=1

where u : R+ ! R+ and j : R+ ! R+ . Here is a family of nonparametric examples.
If J U (x) is additively separable, then
@J(y)
dj(ys )
=
@ys
dys
and

@J

U (x)
dj(ys ) dys
=
@xs
dys dxs
7

where ys = u(xs ); x = (x1 ; x2 ; ::; xN ) and y = (y1 ; y2 ; ::; yN ):To check if J U (x) is
strictly concave in x, we compute the Hessian of J U (x), where we use the chain
rule:
@
@ 2 J U (x)
=
@xs @xr

@J U (x)
@xr

@
=

@xs

dj(yr ) dyr
dyr dxr

@
=

@xs

dj(yr ) dyr
dyr dxr

@xs

= 0 if s 6= r:

The diagonal of the Hessian
@2J

U (x)
=
@x2s

where

d2 j(ys )
dys2

dys
dxs

2

+

d2 ys
dx2s

dj(ys )
dys

d2 j(ys )
d2 ys
>
0
and
< 0 for 1
dys2
dx2s

Hence the Hessian matrix

s

for 1

s

N

N:

@ 2 J U (x)
@xs @xr

is negative de…nite at x i¤
d2 j(ys )
dys2

dys
dxs

2

d2 ys
dx2s

dj(ys )
dys

+

< 0 f or 1

s

N:

In fact, every smooth, additively-separable concave (convex) utility function over
state-contingent claims can be represented
Pj=Nas a Keynesian utility function. That is,
we now show: If F (x1 ; x2 ; :::; xN )
j=1 f (xj ) is a smooth, monotone, concave
N
(convex) utility function on R++ then F (x1 ; x2 ; :::; xN ) be represented as the composition of the investor’s concave (convex) preferences for risk and her concave (convex)
preferences for ambiguity. This representation is unique modulo the investor’s preferences for risk.
Theorem 1 If f (w) is a smooth, monotone concave univariate function of w and
y = g(w) is a smooth, monotone concave univariate function of w. Then there exist
a smooth, monotone concave univariate function of y, h(y), such that for all w:
f (w) = h g(w):
Proof. Applying the chain rule
df
dw

dh dy
:
dy dw

That is,
dh
dy
Hence
h(y)

h(y0 )

Z

df
dw
y

y0

dh
dy
dy
8

dy
dw
Z

w

w0

1

:
df
dw

dy
dw

1

dw

where
y = g(w) and y0 = g(w0 )
h(y) is smooth and monotone
h i2
d2 f
d2 h dy
If dw
+
2
2
dw
dy

dh d2 y
dy dw2

h

2

then ddyh2

Hence

d2 h
dy 2
d
dw

ln

h

<0,

df dy
dw = dw

i

d2 f
dw2

<

dh d2 y
dy dw2

h

df dy
dw = dw

< 0 , ln

=
i

h

df
dw

ih

dy
dw

< K0 ,

i

df
dw

1

d2 f
dw2

d2 y
dw2

,

dh d2 y
dy dw2

d2 f df
=
dw2 dw

i h i2
dy
= dw
:
<

d2 y dy
=
dw2 dw

,

dy
< [exp K0 ] dw
where K0 = ln

h

i

df dy
dw = dw w
0

That is, h(y) is concave on (y0 ; +1). A similar argument su¢ ces for convex f and
g:
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Quadratic Utilities for Risk and Ambiguity

In this section we analyze the case of quadratic utilities and give the conditions
under which the investor is optimistic or pessimistic. Here we show that for some
class of asymmetric Keynesian utilities, that is when the investor is risk averse yet
ambiguity seeking or vice versa, there are regions where the investor is optimistic and
others where the investor is pessimistic. The intuition for the analysis in this section
derives from the following example of the composition of two quadratic univariate
polynomials, where we compute higher order derivatives of the composite function
using chain rules for higher derivatives attributed to Faa di Bruno — see Johnson
(2000) for the history. Here we follow the exposition in Spindler (2005). If
U (x) =
J(y) =

0
0

+
+

1x

+ 2 x2 ) rx U (x) =

1

+ x ) r2x U (x) =

) r3x U (x) = 0

1y

+ 2 y 2 ) ry J(y) =

1

+ y ) r2y J(y) =

) r3y J(y) = 0

then we denote the composition as J
higher order derivatives of J U (x)
rx J
r2x J
r3x J

U (x) = [rU (x) J

U (x) = [r2U (x) J
r2x J

U (x). We use the chain rule to compute the
U (x)][rx U (x)]

U (x)][rx U (x)]2 + [rU (x) J

U (x) = [rx U (x)]2 + [rU (x) J

U (x) = 2 [r2x U (x)][rx U (x)] + [r2U (x) J
r4x J

rK
x J

U (x)][r2x U (x)]

U (x)]

U (x)][rx U (x)] = 3

U (x) = 3

U (x) = 0 for K

[rx U (x)]

2

5:

If [rU (x) J U (x)] > 0, rx U (x) > 0 and sign( ) = sign( ) > 0, then rx J U (x) >
0 and r2x J U (x) > 0:That is, J U (x) is a monotone, convex function of x: If
9

rU (x) J U (x)] > 0, rx U (x) > 0 and sign( ) = sign( ) < 0, then rx J U (x) > 0 and
r2x J U (x) < 0. That is, J U (x) is a monotone, concave function of x. We reduce the
multivariate case to the univariate case by assuming that the symmetric Keynesian
utilities of bulls and bears are speci…ed by monotone, convex or concave quadratic
multivariate polynomials where the Hessians are positive or negative de…nite diagonal
matrices with equal eigenvalues.
We propose semiparametric speci…cations of preferences for risk and preferences
for ambiguity, de…ned by scalar proxies for risk and ambiguity: and . Piecewise
linear-quadratic functions were introduced by Rockafellar (1988). A function f :
RN ! R is called piecewise linear-quadratic if the domain of f can be represented as
the union of …nitely many polyhedral sets, where relative to each set f (x) is of the
form 21 xDx + d x + , where 2 R; d 2 RN and D 2 RN N is a symmetric matrix.
A special case is where the domain of f consists of a single set. Concave quadratic
utility functions were introduced by Shannon and Zame (2002) in their analysis of
indeterminacy in in…nite dimension general equilibrium models. f (x) is a concave
quadratic function if for all y and z :
f (y) < f (z) + rf (z) (y

1
2K

z)

ky

zk2 , where K > 0:

In addition,we assume that
min rf (z) > 0, where
z

is the social endowment:

J U (x) is the composition of a smooth, concave quadratic map U (x);where U (x) is
N and a smooth, convex quadratic function
a diagonal N N matrix for each x 2 R++
J(y). If u : R+ ! R+ , then
U (x)

(u(x1 ); u(x2 ); :::; u(xN ))

is the state-utility vector for the state-contingent claim
x = (x1 ; x2 ; :::; xN ):
If z = [z1 ; z2 ; :::; zN ] and w = [w1 ; w2 ; :::; wN ], then
z w

[z1 w1 ; z2 w2 ; :::; zN wN ]

is the Hadamard or pointwise product of z and w. If we de…ne the gradient of
state-utiliy vector U (x) as the vector
rx U (x)

[@u(x1 ); @u(x2 ); :::; @u(xN )]

then by the chain rule
rx J

U (x) = [rx U (x)] [rU (x) J(U (x))]:

If
G(x) = z(x) w(x);
10

N , then Bentler and Lee (1978) state and Magnus and
where z(x) and w(x) 2 R++
Neudecker (1985) prove that

rx G(x) = rx z(x)diag(w(x)) + rx w(x)diag(z(x))
The following analysis in this section derives from the following representation of
r2x J U (x):
r2x J

U (x) = rx ([rx U (x)] [rU (x) J(U (x))])

= [r2U (x) J(U (x))](diag[rx U (x)])2 + [r2x U (x)]diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]:

If U (x) is a concave quadratic map and J(y) is a convex quadratic function, then
r2x U (x) =

diag( ) < 0

and
r2y J(y) = diag( ) > 0=

If A and B are N xN symmetric matrices then A - B i¤ A B is negative semide…nite,
denoted: [A B] . 0, where
r2x J

U (x) . 0 i¤ diag( )diag[rx U (x)]2

diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U (x))] . 0

See matrix inequalities in section A.5.2 in Boyd and Vandenberghe for a discussion
of the partial ordering . on the linear vector space of N N symmetric matrices.
For diagonal N N matrices E and F :
E.F ,E

F:

If Keynesian utilities are the composition of quadratic utilities for risk and quadratic
utilities for ambiguity, then all higher order derivatives, i.e., greater than four, are
zero. Hence this class of Keynesian utilities have representations as fourth order
multivariate Taylor polynomials. These results follow from repeated application of
the chain rule to derivatives of the Keynesian utilities.
Theorem 2 If J U (x) is the composition of quadratic utilities for risk and quadratic
utilities for ambiguity,where
diag( ) = diag[r2x U (x)] and diag( ) = diag[r2U (x) J(U (x)]
then rK
x J

U (x)

0 for K

5:

Proof. If
rx J

U (x) = [rx U (x)] [rU (x) J(U (x))]:

then
r2x J

U (x) = diag( )(diag[rx U (x)])2 + diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]
11

r3x J

U (x) = 3diag( )diag( )diag[rx U (x)]
r4x J

U (x) = 3[diag( )]2 [diag( )]

rK
x J

U (x) = 0 for K

5:

In Theorems 2 and 3, we characterize asymmetric Keynesian utilities, where we
N into the standard four
prove the existence of a reference point x
^ that partitions R+
quadrants, with the reference point x
^ as the origin. J U (x) is concave in quadrant
N :x
I;where quadrant I fx 2 R+
x
^g and convex in quadrant III, where quadrant
N : x
III
fx 2 R+
x
^g The Hessian of J U (x) is inde…nite in quadrants II and
N =f(^
IV . That is, r2x J U (x) is inde…nite on R+
x; +1] [ (0; x
^]g. J U (x) is optimistic
for “losses,” i.e., x x
^ and pessimistic for “gains,” i.e., x x
^, analogous with the
shape of the utility of risk in prospect theory — see …gure 10 in Kahneman (2011). In
Theorems 4 and 5, we characterize symmetric Keynesian utilities or optimistic and
pessimistic investors.
Theorem 3 If J U (x), is the composition of U (x) and J(y),where (a) (y1 ; y2 ; :::; yN )
y = U (x)
(u(x1 ); u(x2 ); :::; u(xN )) is a monotone, smooth, concave, diagonal
N onto RN , with the proxy for risk,
< 0, (b) J(y) is
quadratic map from R++
++
N into R, with the proxy for
a monotone, smooth, convex quadratic function from R+
ambiguity, > 0, (c)
r2x J

^ (x) = diag( )(diag[rx U
^ (x)])2
U

^ (x))]: Chain Rule
diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U

then there exists a reference point x
^ such that the …nancial market data D is rationalized by the composite function J(U (x)) with two domains of convexity: (^
x; +1]
and (0; x
^], where J U (x) is concave on (^
x; +1] and J U (x) is convex on (0; x
^]:
Proof.
r2x U (x) =

diag( ) where

> 0: Risk-Averse

r2U (x) J(U (x)) = diag( ) where
r2x J

U (x) = diag( )(diag[rx U (x)])2
lim

kxk1 !1

diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]

1

diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]: Chain Rule

diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]

diag[rx U (x)]2

> 0: Ambiguity-Seeking

1

diag[rx U (x)]2

diag[rU (x) J(U (b
x))]

lim diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]diag[rx U (x)]

x!0

diag[rU (x) J(U (x))]

1

diag[rx U (x)]2

1

1

=0

diag[rx U (b
x)]2

2
1

=0

diag[rU (x) J(U (b
x))]diag[rx U (b
x)]
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diag[ ]: Bears

2

diag[ ]: Bulls

Theorem 4 If J U (x), is the composition of U (x) and J(y),where (a) (y1 ; y2 ; :::; yN )
y = U (x) (u(x1 ); u(x2 ); :::; u(xN )) is a monotone, smooth, convex, diagonal quadratic
N onto RN with the proxy for risk,
map from R++
> 0, (b) J(y) is a monotone,
++
N
smooth, concave quadratic function from R+ into R with the proxy for risk,
< 0,
(c)
^ (x) =
U

r2x J

^ (x)])2 + diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U
^ (x))]: Chain Rule
diag( )(diag[rx U

then there exists a reference point x
^ such that the …nancial market data D is rationalized by the composite function J(U (x)) with two domains of convexity: (^
x; +1]
and (0; x
^], where J U (x) is concave on (^
x; +1] and J U (x) is convex on (0; x
^]:
Proof.
r2x U (x) = diag( ) where

r2U^ (x) J(U (x)) =
^ (x) =
U

r2x J

> 0: Risk-Seeking

diag( ) where

> 0: Ambiguity-Averse

^ (x)])2 + diag( )diagrU (x) J(U
^ (x))]: Chain Rule
diag( )(diag[rx U
lim

kxk1 !1

^ (x))]diag[rx U
^ (x)]
diag[rU (x) J(U

^ (x))]diag[rx U
^ (x)]
diag[rU (x) J(U
lim

kxk!0

2

2

1

=0

^ (^
^ (^
diag[rU (x) J(U
x))]diag[rx U
x)]

^ (x))]
diag[rU (x) J(U

^ (x))]diag[rx U
^ (x)]
diag[rU (x) J(U

2

1

^ (x)]2
diag[rx U

1

2

diag[ ]: Bears

2

diag[ ]: Bulls:

=0

^ (^
^ (^
diag[rU (x) J(U
x))]diag[rx U
x)]

Theorem 5 If J U (x), is the composition of U (x) and J(y),where (a) (y1 ; y2 ; :::; yN )
y = U (x)
(u(x1 ); u(x2 ); :::; u(xN )) is a monotone, smooth, concave, diagonal
N onto RN , with the proxy for risk,
< 0, (b) J(y) is
quadratic map from R++
++
N into R;with the proxy for
a monotone, smooth,concave quadratic function from R++
ambiguity,
< 0, (c)
r2x J

^ (x) =
U

then J

^ (x)])2
diag( )(diag[rx U

^ (x))]: Chain Rule:
diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U

N :
U (x) is concave on R++

Proof.
r2x U (x) =

r2U^ (x) J(U (x)) =
r2x J

U (x) =

diag( ) where

> 0: Risk-Averse

diag( ) where

> 0: Ambiguity-Averse

diag( )(diag[rx U (x)])2
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diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U (x))] < 0: Bears:

Theorem 6 If J U (x), is the composition of U (x) and J(y),where (a) (y1 ; y2 ; :::; yN )
y = U (x) (u(x1 ); u(x2 ); :::; u(xN )) is a monotone, smooth, convex, diagonal quadratic
N onto RN , with the proxy for risk,
map from R++
> 0, (b) J(y) is a monotone,
++
N
smooth, convex quadratic function from R++ into R;with the proxy for ambiguity,
> 0, (c)
r2x J
then J

^ (x)])2 + diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U
^ (x))]: Chain Rule
^ (x) = diag( )(diag[rx U
U
N :
U (x) is convex on R++

Proof.
r2x U (x) =

diag( ) where

> 0: Risk-Averse

=

diag( ) where

> 0: Ambiguity-Averse

r2U^ (x) J(U (x))
r2x J

5

U (x) = diag( )(diag[rx U (x)])2 + diag( )diag[rU (x) J(U (x))] > 0: Bulls:

Equilibrium Prices in Asset Markets

Recall the Keynesian aphorism: “The equilibrium prices in asset markets will be
…xed at the point at which the sales of the bears and the purchases of the bulls
are balanced.” In this …nal section, we explicate Keynes’ claim that the prices of
assets today equilibrate the optimism and pessimism of bulls and bears regarding
the payo¤s of assets tomorrow. We assume, that the consumption sets of investors
are convex, open subsets of RN containing the positive orthant and that investors
maximize smooth, monotone concave or smooth, monotone convex Keynesian utility
subject to a budget constraint. The budget constraint is de…ned by market prices
and the investor’s income.
Bears maximize a smooth, monotone, concave (pessimistic) Keynesian utility;
deriving the asset demand of bears is therefore a standard application of the Karush–
Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) Theorem, where in our case the Slater constraint quali…cation
is trivially satis…ed (see Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004)). For this reason, the …rst
order conditions for a saddle-point of the Lagrangian are necessary and su¢ cient for
optimality. For bears, the utility maximizing optimum may be in the interior of the
positive orthant. where the expected odds today, by bears, of tomorrow’s market
prices are equal to the odds determined by today’s market prices.
Bulls maximize a monotone, convex (optimistic) Keynesian utility subject to a
budget constraint. This is quite a di¤erent problem: the optimum in this case is
achieved at an extreme point of the budget set (Rockafellar 1970). If there are only
two states of the world, where the market prices are (1,1) and the investor’s income is
1, then the extreme points of the budget set are (0,0), (0,1) and (1,0). For a monotone
convex utility function, the optimum is achieved at (0,1) or (1,0), the corners of the
budget line. More generally, the utility maximizing optimum for bulls is always on
the boundary of the positive orthant, i.e., bulls speculate on the most optimistic
outcomes.
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We consider a two period investment model with two states of the world, where
x = (x1 ; x2 ) is a state-contingent claim and today’s state prices are (p1 ; p2 ).
Example 7 If the investor’s income today is I and she is endowed with convex Keynesian utilities, UBulls (x), then her optimal investment problem is (P ):
maxfUBulls (x) j

x1

0; x2

0; p x

I

0g

where the Fritz John Lagrangian for constrained maximization
L(x1 ; x2 ;

0;

1;

2;

3)

0 UBulls (x)

1[

x1 ]

2[

x2 ]

3 [p

x

I]

Theorem 8 [Fritz John ]: If x is a local maximizer of (P ) then there exists multipliers
( 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) 0 such that:
0 (@x1 UBulls (x

where

0

); @x2 UBulls (x )) = (

1

+

3 p1 ;

+

3 p2 );

3 p1 ;

3 p2 )

2

= 1, by Theorems 19.12 in Simon and Blume.

Corollary 9 Corollary 10 (a) If x = (0; x2 ), then
0 (@x1 UBulls ((0; x2 )); @x2 UBulls ((0; x2 ))

=(

1

+

It follows that some bulls are more optimistic than the market that tomorrow’s state
of the world is state 2. That is,
p2
3 p2
>
+
p
p1
1
3 1

@x2 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
=
@x1 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
(b) If x = (x1 ; 0);then

0 (@x1 UBulls ((x1 ; 0)); @x2 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))

=(

3 p1 ;

2

+

3 p2 )

It follows that the other bulls are more optimistic than the market that tomorrow’s
state of the world is state 1. That is,
@x1 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
=
@x2 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))

3 p1
2

+

>

3 p2

p1
p2

Example 11 If the investor’s income today is I and she is endowed with concave
Keynesian utilities UBears (x), then her optimal investment problem is (P ):
maxfUBears (x) j x1

0; x2

0; I

p x

0g

where the KKT Lagrangian for constrained maximization
L(x1 ; x2 ; )

UBears (x) +

3 [I
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p x] +

1 x1

+

2 x2 :

Theorem 12 [Karush–Kuhn–Tucker] If Slater’s constraint quali…cation is satis…ed
N , i¤ there exists a multipliers
then x is a maximizer of (P ), where x 2 R+
( 3 ; 1 ; 2 ) 0 such that:
(@x1 UBears (x ); @x2 UBears (x )) = (

3 p1

1;

3 p2

2 ):

Corollary 13 (a) If x = (0; x2 );then
(@x1 UBears ((0; x2 )); @x2 UBears ((0; x2 )) = (

3 p1

1;

3 p2 ):

It follows that some bears are more pessimistic than the market that tomorrow’s state
of the world is state 1. That is,
@x1 UBears ((0; x2 ))
=
@x2 UBears ((0; x2 ))

3 p1

1

3 p2

<

p1
p2

(b)If x = (x1 ; 0), then
(@x1 UBears (x ); @x2 UBears (x )) = (

3 p1

1;

3 p2 ):

It follows that other bears are more pessimistic than the market that tomorrow’s state
of the world is state 2. That is,
@x2 UBears ((x1 ; 0))
=
@x1 UBears ((x1 ; 0))

3 p2
3 p1

2

<

p2
p1

Theorem 14 (a) At the market prices (p1 ; p2 ), some bulls trade Arrow–Debreu statecontingent claims for state 2 with bears for Arrow–Debreu state-contingent claims for
state 1. That is,
@x2 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
p2
>
@x1 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
p1

@x2 UBears ((x1 ; 0))
@x1 UBears ((x1 ; 0))

(b) At the market prices (p1 ; p2 ), other bulls trade Arrow–Debreu state-contingent
claims for state 2 with other bulls for Arrow–Debreu state-contingent claims for state
1. That is,
@x2 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
@x UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
p2
>
> 2
.
@x1 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
p1
@x1 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
(c) At the market prices (p1 ; p2 ), some bulls trade Arrow–Debreu state-contingent
claims for state 1 with bears for Arrow–Debreu state-contingent claims for state 2.
That is,
p1
@x1 UBears ((0; x2 ))
@x1 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
>
:
@x2 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
p2
@x2 UBears ((0; x2 ))
(d) At the market prices (p1 ; p2 ), other bulls trade Arrow-Debreu state-contingent
claims for state 1 with other bulls for Arrow–Debreu state-contingent claims for state
2. That is,
@x1 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
p1
@x UBulls ((0; x2 ))
>
> 1
:
@x2 UBulls ((x1 ; 0))
p2
@x2 UBulls ((0; x2 ))
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Corollary 15 The important di¤ erence between the investments of bulls and bears
is that bulls only speculate, but bears may speculate or diversify. That is,
xBulls = (x1 ; 0) or xBulls = ((0; x2 ))
and
xBears = (x1 ; 0) or xBears = ((0; x2 )) or

@x1 UBears (x )
p1
N
= , where x 2 R++
:
@x2 UBears (x )
p2

The last two examples, suggests a neoclassical model of (ir)rational exuberance in
asset markets, where investors are bulls and bears who maximize Keynesian utilities
subject to budget constraints, de…ned by market prices and the investor’s income.
Consequently, bulls speculate and “bet” on the optimistic realization tomorrow of
state 2 or state 1, but bears diversify and choose a portfolio with Arrow–Debreu
state-contingent claims for both states. The aggregate demand of bulls is diversi…ed.
That is, the aggregate demand of the bulls is the “average”of the demands of the bulls
expecting state 2 to be realized tomorrow and the demands of the bulls expecting
state 1 to be realized tomorrow. Hence the aggregate demand of bulls is typically in
N
R++
Theorem 16 If there is a …nite number of investor classes, where in each class
investors have the same income and in each class, there is a continuum of bulls
with di¤ erent utilities and a continuum of bears with the same utilities, then market
clearing competitive prices exist in asset markets.
Proof. For each vector of market prices, the asset demands of optimistic investors
are concentrated on the corners of their common budget line. The sum of the means
of these distributions over all income classes is the aggregate demand of bulls at the
given market prices. In the two states of the world example, we assume a fraction of
the subclass of bulls with income I demand (0; x2 (p; I)) and a fraction (1
) of the
subclass of bulls with income I demand (x1 (p; I); 0). Hence the aggregate demands
at market prices p for the subclass of optimistic investors with income I is
(1

)(x1 (p; I); 0) + (0; x2 (p; I)) = [(1

)(x1 (p; I); (0; x2 (p; I))] > 0:

The aggregate demands of the subclass of pessimistic investors or bears is the sum of
the means of the distribution of their demands over all income classes. Neoclassical
competitive market prices clear the asset markets if the sum of aggregate demands
of bulls and bears at these prices equals the aggregate supply of assets.
Example 17 Here is an example of existence of a competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with two states of the world.. There is a continuum of bulls indexed
on [0; 1] and a continuum of bears indexed on [0; 1]. The sum of the average endowments of the bulls, Bulls , and the average endowments of the bears, Bears , de…ne
the average social endowment
Bulls + Bears . We construct the associated Edgeworth box, where the X-axis is the payo¤ of the average social endowment in state 1
17

and the Y -axis is the payo¤ of the average social endowment in state 2. Zero is the
origin of the positive orthant for bulls, i.e., x 0 and is the origin of the positive
orthant for bears, i.e., y
. If p = (p1 ; p2 ) is any vector of positive state prices, i.e.,
the payo¤ s of the A D securities tomorrow, where p Bulls I and p Bears J,
then as in the earlier example there exists a fraction 2 (0; 1) of bulls who demand
the asset with payo¤ s (1p1 ; 0) and a fraction (1
) 2 (0; 1) of bulls who demand the
asset with payo¤ s (0; 1=p2 ). Hence aggregate demand of the bulls at state prices p is
z

I
; (1
p1

)

I
p2

:

In the Edgeworth box, z is a point on the interior of the budget line p x = I, where
x = (x1 ; x2 ) is a state-contingent claim in the positive orthant for bulls. In this
example, if every bear maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint p y = J,
where y =
x and z is a state-contingent claim in the positive orthant for the bulls
, then [p; z;
z] is a competitive equilibrium in any exchange economy, where all
bears are endowed with the same concave utility function U (y) and
z = arg max U (y):
p y=J

Of course, a much less restrictive existence proof of a competitive equilibrium in an
exchange economy with a continuum of traders is the well-known existence theorem
of Aumann (1969), where agents need not be endowed with convex preferences, i.e.,
N.
quasi-concave preferences, and consumption sets are R+
Example 18 Here is an example of comparative statics in an exchange economy
with two states of the world, where there is one type of bears and two types of bulls.
Bulls and bears have additively-separable utilities, hence representable as Keynesian
utilities by Theorem 1. Both types of bulls have the same income LBull , hence the
same budget set for any pair of market prices. Bears are endowed with Cobb–Douglas
utilities, so their demands are never at the corners of the budget line, but bulls are
endowed with smooth, monotone quadratic, convex utilities and their demands are
only at the corners. The distribution of bulls is de…ned by 2 [0; 1].
is the % of
type 1 bulls. Type 1 bulls only demand A D securities for state 1. (1
) is the %
of type 2 bulls. Type 2 bulls only demand A D securities for state 2. The demand
functions for the bears are
XBear (p1 ; p2 ; IBear ) =

IBear IBear
;
p1
p2

where

+

= 1 and

The demand functions for the bulls are
!
IBull 2
; 0 and XBull2 (p1 ; p2 ; IBull ) = (1
XBull1 (p1 ; p2 ; IBull ) =
p1

;

> 0:

IBull
) 0;
p2

2

!

:

Hence XBull (p1 ; p2 ; IBull ), is the aggregate demand of the bulls ,where
XBull (p1 ; p2 ; IBull )

XBull1 (p1 ; p2 ; IBull )+XBull2 (p1 ; p2 ; IBull ) =
18

IBull
p1

2

; (1

IBull
)
p2

2

!

:

If state 2 is the numeraire, i.e.,
p2 = 1 and p1 > 0
then it follows from Walras’ law that it su¢ ces to …nd p1 such that the market for
state 1 clears. If
p1 IBear
IBull 2
] +
= !1;
[
p1
p1
where !

(! 1 ; ! 2 ) is the social endowment,then the equilibrium price
p1 =

where the critical value for
if

IBear

([ IBear ]2 + 4 [IBull ]2 ! 1 )1=2
;
2! 1

is 0. That is,

! 0 then p1 ! 0 or p1 !

IBear
where p1
!1

0 is infeasible.

The unique, feasible equilibrium price
p1 ( )

IBear + ([ IBear ]2 + 4 [IBull ]2 ! 1 )1=2
;
2! 1

where p1 ( ) is a strictly concave,monotone function of

6

on (0; 1]:
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